### Introduction:

### **Initial successes**

- Japan entered WW2 through the attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941 by the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service. Intention was to incapacitate the US Pacific Fleet at the naval base.
  - Albert Craig "a brilliant tactical victory and a disastrous psychological error"
- Following attack, launched Pacific "blitzkrieg" across Western colonies in Southeast Asia
- Expanded empire under 1940 Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere
  - Feb 1942: Singapore
  - March 1942: Dutch East Indies
  - May 1942: Philippines + Northern Burma
  - Within first 6 months of 1942: Northern New Guinea, Pacific island groups (Solomons, Gilbert Islands)
- Context of growing Japanese imperialism
  - 1937 outbreak of Sino-Japanese War
  - Already had conquests in Korea and Taiwan and majority of NE China

### **Eventual failures**

- America declared war on 8 Dec 1941 following PH attack
- Turning point of WW2 Battle of Midway June 1942
  - Following which Japan put on the defensive in 1942-3 Battle of Guadalcanal
- Surrendered September 1945 after the atomic bombs dropped on metropolises Hiroshima and Nagasaki

## **Reasons for initial victory**

| #1: Preparedness for war through militarists' superior control over nation  |  |
|---|--|
| Militarism seized control of different facets of Japanese society   | Turning point was military hijacking of politics   |
|   | Deeply penetrated political, economic and social   |
| Storry: Domestic affairs shifted to aggressive militarism in 1930s  | spheres for war mobilisation.  |
| Political decision making   | <ul> <li>Britain and France preoccupied with Hitler in<br/>Europe</li> </ul>                                 |
| <ul> <li>1937 Liaison Conference         <ul> <li>coordinated military bodies with<br/>government</li> </ul> </li> </ul>          | <ul> <li>USA only began peacetime recruitment in<br/>September 1940, no fortification of colonies</li> </ul> |
| <ul> <li>1940 Imperial Rule Association         <ul> <li>replaced political parties with<br/>military rule</li> </ul> </li> </ul> | ⇒ Running start with superior mobilisation of<br>human and economic resources                                |
| <ul> <li>Jingoistic politicians like General Tojo as PM</li> </ul>  | Long-term tool of Shinto-militarism embedded in Japanese politics and psyche                                 |

| Size of army (conscription)                                    | Long-term indoctrination of Imperial Way               |
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| #2: Military strength  | in strategy and tactics                                |
| organised forced labour  |  |
| Zaibatsus like Nippon Steel and Sumitomo                       |  |
| Sakhalin, Papua New Guinea                                     |  |
| • Built military facilities on Jeju island,                    |  |
| labour   |  |
| • 2 million Koreans conscripted as forced                      |  |
| war industries   |  |
| Drafting of civilians of Japanese empire into                  |  |
| 1939 National Service Ordinance Law                            |  |
| command economy  |  |
| <ul> <li>Total control over civilian population and</li> </ul> |  |
| 1938 National Mobilisation Law                                 | <ul> <li>Prevented fortification of Malaya</li> </ul>  |
|  | and Repulse  |
| <ul> <li>Mitsubishi produced 10 939 Zeroes</li> </ul>          | • Divebombers to sink British Prince of Wales          |
| of industries  | • 79 Zeroes used in Pearl Harbour                      |
| Harnessed zaibatsu through nationalisation                     |  |
| <ul> <li>75% of budget for military spending (1937)</li> </ul> | their military strength to achieve initial successes   |
| Economy  | Backbone of military aggression, crucial in bolstering |
| ightarrow Widespread societal support for war galvanised       | state  |
| • 1940 GEACPS  | <ul> <li>Collective mindset of servitude to</li> </ul> |
| <ul> <li>1937 Kokutai no hongi</li> </ul>                      | <ul> <li>1890 Rescript</li> </ul>                      |
| Social mobilisation  | population   |
|  | • Kokutai, national polity, ingrained in civilian      |
| mobilisation of war  | Shintoism primed the population for war                |
| ightarrow Allowed for military to engage in unhindered         | Couching societal mindsets in traditional              |

- National conscription system since 1873
- 1938 National Mobilisation Law
  - Total control over civilian population.
- National Service Draft Ordinance • (supplemented mobilisation law)

### **Discipline of army**

- Emperor worship and ingrained Shinto-nationalism
- Dedication and loyalty to cause troops were determined and morale was high
- *Shinmin no Michi* manifesto, August 1941

Mid-term intensification in ultranationalism of young military officers by repeated foreign policy frustrations

- Wave of radical fanaticism seen in 1936 coup •
- Flames of nationalistic militarism fanned by • 1930s societies
  - Cherry Blossom Society and Blood Brotherhood League

| <ul> <li>○ Deified Emperor Hirohito's war campaign as "holy"</li> <li>Experience from war in China allowed for resourcefulness, tactical ingenuity</li> <li>● Translated experience to forested terrains of Singapore and Malaya.</li> <li>● Developed wheels on tanks + used bicycles to traverse Malaysian marshland</li> <li>→ captured Singapore despite facing an army twice as large.</li> </ul> | Short-term: Japan's ingenious approaches to warfare<br>undermined traditional defences of opponents<br>→ Gained pivotal victories  |
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| <ul> <li>Superior strategy and organisation</li> <li>1. Clear strategic objectives         <ul> <li>Military outlined Southern Plan and Eastern Plan</li> <li>Eastern plan - attacking PH and Philippines.                 <ul></ul></li></ul></li></ul>   | <ul> <li>Crucial advantage in element of surprise, established foothold for Japan in region to execute expansion</li> <li>1. Crippled largest military presence in the Pacific (USA) <ul> <li>a. Temporal naval superiority in the region</li> </ul> </li> <li>2. Proximity of Philippines to SEA colonies <ul> <li>Base for Japanese air force to defend navy = air supremacy in region</li> </ul> </li> <li>Implementation and time scope: <ul> <li>Targeted America + posessions in Pacific while US Pacific Fleet was incapacitated.</li> <li>Rapid and swift conquering through Blitzkrieg</li> </ul> </li> </ul> |
| <ul> <li>Cost Americans 13 ships and 2400 people</li> <li>Damaged US Pacific Fleet and Asiatic Squadron</li> <li>Philippines         <ul> <li>Bombed US Air Force at Clark Field hours after PH attack</li> <li>American planes were grounded</li> <li>Lost nearly 100 aircraft</li> </ul> </li> <li>→ Strategic brilliance: Philippines was reliant on US fleet at PH for defense</li> </ul>          | <ul> <li>Guam 10 Dec</li> <li>Wake island 23 Dec</li> <li>Hong Kong fell in 13 days</li> <li>Singapore Feb 1942 fell in 8 days</li> <li>By March 1942: captured Burma,<br/>Singapore, Malaya, Dutch East Indies</li> <li>⇒ Rapidity of Japanese attack left Allies unprepared<br/>to defend their imperial possessions</li> </ul>  |

#3: Weaknesses of Western powers in defense of colonies

|   | Sun Ruy   |
|---|---|
| Militarily weak - complacent and unprepared to defend colonies  | Jansen: Particularly critical of colonial powers,<br>contrasts against military ingenuity of Japanese in<br>adapting to terrain   |
| <ul> <li>British Hong Kong</li> <li>Did not prepare defence for prolonged siege,<br/>fell in 13 days.</li> <li>Water supply vulnerable, far from British<br/>base</li> </ul>  | <ul> <li>→ Japan's regional superiority in military power<br/>was <u>relative</u> to the unpreparedness of Allied powers.</li> <li>Especially evident once USA and Britain started<br/>investing more in WW2 in the Pacific theatre that</li> </ul>   |
| <ul> <li>American Philippines</li> <li>Weak garrison of soldiers</li> <li>Air Force grounded when bombed by<br/>Japanese</li> <li>Singapore</li> <li>British did not prepare any defence against<br/>attack from Jungle</li> <li>Surrendered with Army twice as large</li> </ul>  | <ul> <li>initial advantage was premised on Allied weakness.</li> <li>Evaluative: Dutch East Indies esp important. <ul> <li>Access to raw materials and oil</li> <li>1941 trade embargo on oil</li> <li>Oil stock only 1.5 years left by 1941</li> </ul> </li> <li>→ Fuelling Japan's war machine</li> </ul> |
| <ul> <li>Dutch East Indies</li> <li>98,000 Indonesian army surrendered<br/>without fighting to Japan 12 March 1942</li> </ul>   |   |
| <ul> <li>Unpopular in colonies</li> <li>Western Powers did not arm native populations</li> <li>Some desired to be liberated from Western imperialism.</li> <li>Indonesian army did not fight to prolong Dutch rule</li> </ul>   | <b>GEACPS</b> - Pan-Asian cultural slant, removing the yoke of Western imperialism  |
| #4: Japan's GEACPS Ideology = colonies  | s did not support their colonial powers   |
| <ul> <li>Extended from 1938 New Order in East Asia</li> <li>Political: <ul> <li>removal of Western imperialism</li> <li>measure of independence given to countries</li> <li>Not colonies but satellites</li> </ul> </li> <li>Economic: self-sufficient consumer market</li> <li>Cultural: Pan-Asian values, replacing Western habits</li> </ul> | Synthesis: Western powers unpopular in colonies<br>Western Powers did not arm native populations<br>→ Some desired to be liberated from Western<br>imperialism. Made for easier succession of Japanese<br>rule over exploited colonies  |
| Nature of Japanese occupation   | 1. Intention  |

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| <ul> <li>Growth of independence movements, Japan willing to extend limited political autonomy.</li> <li>Occupied China: <ul> <li>Nov 1940 Wang Jingwei peace agreement with Japan.</li> <li>Japan abolished concessions in old Treaty Ports.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> | <ul> <li>Japanese were not genuinely seeking to empower, paid lip service to independence. Rather saw it as mutually-beneficial to support puppet regimes that lessened organisational burden.</li> <li>2. Consistency</li> <li>Penetration of Japanese control into politics of colonies varied according to their import to war</li> </ul> |
| <ul> <li>Burma:</li> <li>Ruled through puppet Ba Maw.</li> <li>August 1943: "independent" <ul> <li>allied with Japan due to rising anti-Japanese sentiments.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>   | <ul> <li>effort</li> <li>East Indies: firmly controlled governance<br/>under leaders Sukarno and Hatta</li> <li>Malaya: Economically important, under tight<br/>military control</li> </ul>  |
| <ul> <li>Philippines:</li> <li>Ruled through political party "Association for<br/>Service to the New Philippines" and puppet<br/>politicians</li> <li>October 1943: "independent"</li> </ul>  |  |
| French Indochina: March 1945, puppet<br>administration under Bo Dai   |  |
| #5: Global c  | context of WW2   |
| <ul> <li>International alliances         <ul> <li>1940 Tripartite Pact with Hitler and<br/>Mussolini</li> <li>Operation Barbarossa: Hitler's success in<br/>Western Europe                 <ul> <li>The Netherlands and France</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </li> </ul>   | Important in Japan gaining a <b>foothold</b> in SEA through<br>DEI   |
| → <b>Opportunism</b> : July 1941 Japan occupied French<br>Indochina through Vichy government to gain<br>resources for war   |  |
| <ul> <li>War in Europe</li> <li>Britain preoccupied with Hitler</li> </ul>  |  |
| <ul> <li>American unpreparedness for war (isolation)</li> <li>Full-scale mobilisation and training had not taken place</li> <li>Only economic involvements</li> </ul>   |  |

| <ul> <li>Factories produced planes and guns<br/>for British under March 1941<br/>Lend-Lease Act</li> </ul> |
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| • Sept 1941: began peacetime conscription  |
| Unprepared mentality: EG America in  |
| Philippines designed defence on assumption   |
| that the US Pacific Fleet and Asiatic  |
| squadron would be able to come to rescue   |
|  |

# Reasons for eventual defeat

| #1: Lack of strategic planning rendered war economically infeasible |   |
|---|---|
| Poor management of Co-Prosperity Sphere failed to                   | Sustained and long-term pressure placed on Japan's              |
| exploit Japan's initial successes                                   | war effort, incapable of defending early gains                  |
|   | <ul> <li>Decreasing returns to scale: over-stretched</li> </ul> |
| 1, Domination of military   | across Pacific  |
| • Failure to grasp economics of war.                                | <ul> <li>Deteriorating quantity and quality of</li> </ul>       |
| <ul> <li>Detracted from civil administration</li> </ul>             | raw materials   |
| needed to manage an Empire.   |   |
|   | Critical analysis: Division between military and civil          |
| November 1942 established the GEACPS                                | leadership.   |
| Ministry in Tokyo.  | • 1940 Imperial Rule Association: Militarists                   |
| <ul> <li>Ministry lacked effective political</li> </ul>             | replaced political parties entirely                             |
| power against army commanders                                       | Poor strategic planning: Provoked America                       |
| <ul> <li>Civil servants had inadequate</li> </ul>                   | into full-scale war after Pearl Harbor to                       |
| knowledge of SEA colonies   | launch Pacific Blitzkrieg                                       |
| • Lack of trained personnel in colonies                             | <ul> <li>Diminishing marginal returns: cost of</li> </ul>       |
|   | fighting largest economic power far                             |
| 2, Japanese High Command failed to harness                          | greater than tangible gains from SEA                            |
| abundance of raw materials from colonies                            |   |
|   | Hane: Lack of war economy single determinant of                 |
| • Owned 80% of world's rubber, 54% of tin                           | military defeat   |
| and key oil wells   |   |
| BUT did not plan convoy systems / protected                         | Evaluative: Failure to restore oil production fatal             |
| shipping routes for Japanese tankers                                | Aircraft were grounded by 1943 due to oil                       |
|   | famines   |
| 1. Did not restore oil production after removal                     | <ul> <li>Naval operations as well</li> </ul>                    |
| of Europeans in Dutch East Indies                                   |   |
| 2. Pre-war imported 3 million tonnes of iron                        | $\Rightarrow$ Japan's disintegrating monopoly over air and seas |
| ore from Malaya.  | Success of Admiral Nimitz's island-hopping                      |
| a. 1942: shrank to 100,000 tonnes                                   | campaign (1944-45)  |

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| <ol> <li>Merchant marine shrank from 10 million<br/>tonnes at peak, to 1.8 million tonnes</li> </ol> |  |
| tonnes at peak, to 1.8 minion tonnes   |  |
| $\Rightarrow$ Allowed Allies to gradually establish monopoly   |  |
| over Pacific shipping routes   |  |
| #2: Technological inferiority on 2 fronts: arma  | ment production + development of technology                    |
| 1, Technological inferiority prevented industrial  | Storry: technological stagnation most decisive                 |
| production required to defend empire   | single factor in Japan's collapsed war effort                  |
| <ul> <li>Produced 16 carriers throughout war vs</li> </ul>   | Evaluative: Midway was tipping point that shifted              |
| America's 160  | balance of power in Pacific firmly against Japan               |
| • 1943: aircraft production ½ of America's   | <ul> <li>Japan lost initiative: placed on defensive</li> </ul> |
| • US produced > 260,000 airplanes vs   | Crippled Japanese Navy   |
| Japan's 59,000   | • 4 aircraft carriers never replaced                           |
| ⇒ Fighting power rapidly decelerated, facilitated<br>Allied decisive and rapid series of offensives  | Glaring disparity in armaments production                      |
|  | <ul> <li>Japan failed to prioritise technological</li> </ul>   |
| • 1943: Japan was using wooden ships to  | development vital for resisting Allied war                     |
| transport supplies   | machine  |
| • 1944: < 100 functioning planes available for   | Manifested in key industries: carriers largely                 |
| the defense of the Philippines   | determinant of military outcomes                               |
| • MacArthur captures following 1944  |  |
| Battle of Leyte Gulf   | Synthesis: blame myopic leadership of High<br>Command          |
|  | 1. Lacked economic foresight on demands that                   |
|  | would strain Japan's already over-taxed economy                |
| 2, Stagnated technological developments impeded military performance                                 | 2. Army-navy rivalry, competing claims over                    |
| Underdeveloped radar technology  | resources  |
| Failed to progress Sonar Asdic devices to  | Ministry of Munitions only established in                      |
| locate Allied submarines   | 1943   |
| <ul> <li>= could not defend transportation</li> </ul>  | <ul> <li>Attempted to coordinate arms</li> </ul>               |
| network  | production, ineffectual  |
| • Fatal loss of 1942 Battle of Midway  |  |
| <ul> <li>No radar system to detect US Pacific<br/>fleet</li> </ul>                                   |  |
| <ul> <li>Nagumo lost 4 aircraft carriers + 332<br/>aircraft</li> </ul>                               |  |
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| Pearl Harbour Offensive (7 Dec 1941)                           | Craig: "Brilliant tactical victory, disastrous                  |
|  | psychological error"  |
| Tactical miscalculation  | $\rightarrow$ Overestimated American commitment to              |
| • Targeted ships rather than permanent                         | isolationism; underestimated fury of public opinion             |
| installations  |   |
| <ul> <li>Oil tanks, ammunition sites, repair</li> </ul>        | Time scope:   |
| facilities   | 1, Intention of quick pre-emptive strike became                 |
| <ul> <li>No aircraft carriers were present.</li> </ul>         | protracted war of attrition                                     |
|  | Compounded upon long-term inconclusive                          |
| $\rightarrow$ Fast recovery of USA                             | war with China  |
| Launching Doolittle Air Raids on Tokyo by                      | • 3.2 million Japanese tied down + 1.9                          |
| April 1942   | million casualties  |
|  | <ul> <li>Drain in strength and morale</li> </ul>                |
| Strategic blunder  |   |
| <ul> <li>Provoked largest economic superpower</li> </ul>       | 2, Japan's initial advantage rapidly wore off once              |
| <ul> <li>8 Dec 1941: declared war</li> </ul>                   | Allies started investing more into Pacific theatre              |
| <ul> <li>American public opinion galvanised against</li> </ul> |   |
| Japan  |   |
| <ul> <li>Americans invested 10% of incomes</li> </ul>          |   |
| in war bonds   |   |
| <ul> <li>Allowed 40% of GDP to go towards</li> </ul>           |   |
| war effort   |   |
|  |   |
| Individual blunders of battles                                 |   |
| Midway   |   |
| • Over-reliant on the element of                               |   |
| surprise. Unable to adapt to                                   |   |
| American ambush  |   |
| <ul> <li>Inflexible against modern warfare</li> </ul>          |   |
| tactics like Thach Weave                                       |   |
| #4: Allied counter-efforts: superior                           | strategies and economic production                              |
| Economic warfare:  | Dual advantage over Japan                                       |
| 1, Disruption of Japanese access to raw materials              | 1. Modern industrial capitalist state                           |
| <ul> <li>1942 submarine attacks began disruption</li> </ul>    | 2. Natural advantage: human and natural                         |
| trade. Cut Japan off from Empire as war                        | resources   |
| progressed   |   |
| • By 1944: 150 US submarines patrolling to                     | $\rightarrow$ Inherently better positioned to absorb losses and |
| sink Japanese shipping   | withstand protracted warfare on a scale far greater             |
|  | • 1942 Battle of Coral Sea: Yorktown carrier                    |
| 2, Industrial production                                       | damaged   |
| • Ford and Chrysler mass-produced tanks and                    | <ul> <li>Subsequent battle of midway: repaired</li> </ul>       |
| B-24 bombers   |   |
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| <ul> <li>Most destructive bomber produced<br/>at rate of 1 per hour 😳</li> <li>American B29 and P51 planes superior to<br/>Japanese Zeroes</li> <li>America had 78 times more natural<br/>resources necessary for war than Japan</li> <li>America's offensive</li> </ul> | <ul> <li>Evaluate: Japan's squandering of her initial advantage accelerated her defeat, but whether she stood a chance against USA's economic dominance is debatable</li> <li>→ Japan faced inherent disadvantage beyond her control</li> <li>America's combination of aerial and naval attacks</li> </ul>   |
| Island-hopping strategy allowed two-pronged  | cut Japan off from empire  |
| advance in Pacific   |  |
| <ul> <li>MacArthur in South = fought to Philippines</li> <li>Admiral Nimitz secured strategic islands         <ul> <li>Gilbert, Marshall, Marianas</li> </ul> </li> </ul>  | <ol> <li>Civilian impact: Shortage of raw materials<br/>and consumer goods and food</li> <li>Military impact: industry incapacitated</li> </ol>  |
| <ul> <li>Iwojima etc</li> </ul>  | <b>Scope:</b> Japan militarily defeated early on. From Feb 1943 Battle of Guadalcanal, already put on  |
| → Military success of island hopping:  | defensive. Failed to secure any decisive victories   |
| <ul> <li>→ Military success of Island hopping:         <ol> <li>Secured islands to construct landing strips and military bases</li> <li>Launch mainland invasion using B-29s                 <ul></ul></li></ol></li></ul>   | <ul> <li>defensive. Failed to secure any decisive victories</li> <li>Hastings: Atomic bomb ended the war</li> <li>Overy: Atomic bombs accelerated victory of Allies.</li> <li>Japan was militarily finished, would have surrendered by September 1945.</li> <li>Catalyst for complete defeat <ul> <li>Japanese economy was already in a state of internal collapse, crumbling control over colonies.</li> <li>But civilian targeting coupled with Russia's declaration of war on 8 August forced surrender.</li> </ul> </li> </ul> |
| <ul> <li>Atomic bombs</li> <li>Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 6 and 9 August 1945</li> <li>Casualties estimated to be 150,000 and 75,000</li> </ul>   |  |
| #5: Resistar   | nce from colonies  |
| Economic exploitation continued<br>Social repression   | Allied reconquest was seen as a form of liberation for Asian populations.  |

| <ul> <li>Brutal Japanese soldiers - eg Sook Ching<br/>massacres of 50,000 ethnic Chinese</li> <li>Up to 20,000 Korean comfort women</li> </ul> |
|--|
| ightarrow Myopic and short-sighted   |
| Destroyed initial goodwill of displacing former  |
| colonial rulers. When faced with resurgent Allied  |
| efforts conquered populations did not resist   |
| <ul> <li>MacArthur and Philippines 1944</li> </ul>   |
| <ul> <li>Malaya and Singapore back to British 1945</li> </ul>  |
|  |